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The authors compare the two merger control systems 
currently employed worldwide: a mandatory system 
based on merger size threshold and a voluntary system 
with ex-post monitoring and fines. The voluntary 
system possesses two informational advantages: (i) 
the enforcement agency employs more information—
verifiable and non verifiable parameters—to decide the 
set of mergers to investigate, and (ii) the first move of 
merging firms reveals useful information to the agency 
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about the competitive risk of a merger. If fines for undue 
omission to notify are upward limited, then a mixed 
mechanism is optimal, where small transactions are under 
a voluntary regime while the big mergers are obliged to 
report. Remedies for fixing anticompetitive mergers act as 
an instrument that induces firms to notify the operation, 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Although there is agreement worldwide about the economic goals pursued by merger 
enforcement, some differences remain at the implementation level, in particular in the 
type of mechanism employed to control mergers. Most developed economies like Europe, 
the United States, Canada and Japan have an obligatory system where all mergers whose 
magnitude is above a predefined threshold must be notified to the antitrust agency before 
consummation. On the contrary, Australia and New Zealand have a voluntary mechanism 
where firms must decide whether to report the merger on the basis of a set of criteria 
defined by law. Nowadays, many developing countries are starting to implement their 
merger control mechanisms and the choice which system to adopt is a relevant policy 
issue for them.    
 
The purpose of this paper is to compare these two merger control mechanisms –
compulsory and voluntary. We set up a model where the competitive effect of a merger is 
private information of merging firms. This effect can be discovered through costly 
monitoring by the antitrust agency. The population of mergers is characterized by two ex-
ante observable parameters: the size of the transaction and the probability that the merger 
is anticompetitive. The compulsory mechanism is based on the first parameter, due to the 
property of verifiability of the size of the acquired (or acquiring) firm. In order to obtain 
the optimal size threshold above which mergers are inspected before consummation, the 
lawmaker takes in account the average competitive risk of the whole population of 
mergers. On the contrary, the voluntary mechanism with ex post monitoring provides the 
agency with the flexibility to employ all the information –verifiable or not- to decide 
which non self-notified merger to inspect.  This discretional advantage of the voluntary 
scheme seems relevant since competition agencies in the US and Europe spend important 
resources in reviewing mergers that although being above the notification threshold 
posses no competitive risk.
3  
                                                 
3 According to the statistics, more than 95% of the notified mergers in Europe and the US are approved in 
the first phase. 
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The second advantage of the voluntary system –already mentioned by Choe and Shekhar 
(2005) -relies on the fact that the Competition Agency (CA) acts after the firms have 
made a decision about notifying the authorities, which provides some information to the 
agency about the competitive risk of the merger. Since the CA moves in a second stage, 
the agency does not have to inspect all merger cases. The credible threat of an ex –post 
review, and the risk of being fined, discourages anti competitive mergers to take place 
without notification. The lower effective enforcement cost of the voluntary system 
implies that more anticompetitive mergers are inspected and blocked compared with the 
compulsory system. 
 
If maximum fines for unlawful omission to notify are not large enough to induce self 
notification, the superiority of the voluntary system disappears and the optimal solution is 
a mechanism that is contingent on the size of the transaction. Notification should be 
voluntary below a size threshold and compulsory above that level. Finally, the possibility 
to eliminate the anticompetitive effect of some mergers through remedies is an additional 
instrument that eases notification in a voluntary system. Remedies act as a carrot that 
relaxes the incentive compatibility condition that induces anticompetitive operations to be 
self-notified. Thus, remedies reduce the enforcement cost of the voluntary mechanism 
since lower monitoring intensity is required to satisfy the self-notification constraint. This 
benefit arising from the remedies agreed between the CA and the firms is not present in 
the mandatory system.  
 
This paper is structured as follow: In the next section we set up the basic model and the 
enforcement mechanisms we want to compare. In section three we obtain the optimal 
mechanism under constrained maximum fines. In the fourth section we introduce the 
possibility of negotiating remedies between firms and the agency and in section five we 
conclude. 
  3 
2.  The Model 
 
Consider a population of mergers that are characterized by two parameters: the 
magnitude of the transaction, denoted by S, and the anticompetitive risk of a merger 
represented by the parameter ρ. We assume that both, S and ρ, are independent variables 
distributed in the interval [0,Smax] with density f(s) and [0,1] with density g(ρ) 
respectively.  
The magnitude S represents the monetary value of the transaction, i.e. the price paid by 
the acquiring firm to the owners of the acquired company. It may also represent the asset 
value of the newly created firm in case of integration of two companies. The parameter ρ 
is defined as the probability that the merger decreases welfare. It contains all the relevant 
information about the risk that a transaction becomes anticompetitive. For instance, 
variables such as market concentration, change in concentration, entry barriers, likelihood 
of collusion, efficiencies as well as industry specific characteristics are included in the 
probability .  
There is empirical evidence that supports the relationship between the above indicated 
factors and the evaluation of anticompetitive risk by the enforcement agencies. In the 
U.S., Coate, Higgins y Mc Chesney (1990) show that the importance of four competitive 
variables is positively correlated with the possibility that the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) either blocks the merger or asks for remedies.
4 Similar results are found by Coate 
and Ulrick (2006) for a set of second request cases analyzed by the FTC between 1996 
and 2003. In New Zealand, Strong, Bollard y Pickford (2000) found that the firm joint 
market share of the merging firms and the height of entry barriers had a positive effect in 
the probability that dominance were found and the merger were rejected.  
In this model, S and ρ are observed at no cost by the CA but ρ is not verifiable by a third 
party like a court of justice. The different nature of these two parameters is relevant at the 
moment of designing and comparing different notification mechanisms. As discussed 
below, notification rules need to be based on verifiable parameters. 
                                                 
4 The variables included in the regression are level of HHI, change in HHI, entry barriers and likelihood of 
collusion. 
  4About the competitiveness of a proposed merger, we assume two states of nature: The 
operation is either competitive or anticompetitive. In the first case, the merger adds a 
social value normalized to 1. On the contrary, when it is anti-competitive, it generates a 
social cost equals to -1. Formally, we represent the competitive effect by a parameter θ 
such that θ belongs to the set {-1,1}. 
The competitiveness θ is private information of the merging firms and unknown by the 
competition agency. The agency only perceives the risk behind this transaction as is 
captured by ρ. Formally, the parameter  is defined as the probability of  = -1, 
conditional on the set of characteristics Xi of a merger such as the magnitude of entry 
barriers, the concentration in the market, the change in concentration, etc. Thus: 
...] , -1/ [   ob Pr 3 2 1 X ,X X      
We assume that the size of the transaction amplifies the welfare effect of the merger. 
Thus, the change in welfare induced by a merger of size S would be equal to S. It means 
that an anticompetitive merger reduces welfare in S, whereas a competitive one increases 
it in S. A merger that is likely to increase prices by 3%, for instance, is going to be more 
harmful is absolute terms when it affects a market of bigger size.
5  
The competition agency (CA) can spend resources in discovering whether a merger will 
increase or decrease welfare. The CA at cost C can learn whether the transaction is 
competitive or not with total certainty. For simplicity, we assume that the cost C of 
investigating the effect of a merger is independent both on the transaction size S and the 
ex ante risk ρ. It is also assumed that by reviewing the merger, the agency is able to 
generate hard information that can be presented before a court to support a case either for 
blocking or accepting the operation. It is not possible to prevent a merger only based on 
the a priori beliefs represented by ρ. 
The function of the CA is to allow that competitive mergers take place while preventing 
the anticompetitive ones being materialized. Naturally, the cost of reviewing mergers 
restricts the actions that the CA can undertake. Thus, the CA maximizes an objective 
function that contains two components. One is achievement of the CA main goal which is 
                                                 
5 If the market demand is linear, the welfare loss associated  the higher ex-post price is proportional to the 
size of the market 
  5deciding without error, and the second is the cost of the investigation process. We define 
three different merger control mechanisms: 
(i)  Mandatory Discretional Mechanism 
(ii)  Mandatory Mechanism based on Transaction Size Threshold 
(iii)  Voluntary Mechanism     
This division is a useful device to compare mechanisms (ii) and (iii) which is the main 
objective of the paper. 
2.1  Mandatory Discretional Mechanism  
Under this mechanism all mergers must be announced to the CA no matter the transaction 
size or competitive risk. This merging announcement imposes no cost to the involved 
firms and the merger cannot be materialized until the CA explicitly approves it. 
Once the merger is submitted, the agency observes the parameters S and ρ and then 
decides whether to review the merger or not according to the CA’s objective function. If 
the CA resolves not to open an investigation, the merger can be materialized. Otherwise, 
the CA proceeds as mentioned above, studying the effect of the merger. If the 
investigation detects that the merger does not damage competition, the CA will approve 
it. On the contrary, if the outcome of the revision
6 is that the merger is anticompetitive, 
the CA will block the operation. The hard evidence generated by the investigation is 
enough to satisfy the standard of proof required by a court of justice for blocking a 
merger and consequently the court will reject with probability one an appeal from the 
affected firms.  
The CA decides about opening an investigation in base to the expected value of both 
alternatives. If the merger is approved without reviewing, it produces an expected change 
in social welfare equals to Wo: 
) 2 1 ( ) 1 ( 0          S S S W   
When the merger goes through the revision process, the CA incurs in a cost C and the 
merger is approved if it is competitive, otherwise it is rejected. The expected social 
benefit of reviewing a merger net of costs is equal to: 
                                                 
6 The meaning of revision in this article is equivalent to an investigation. 
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Thus, the revision shall take place if and only if 
Wr > W0   or if   ρS > C.   (1) 
Lemma 1: Under a discretional mandatory mechanism, a merger is reviewed if and only 
if the expected competitive damage is bigger then the cost of the revision. 
Lemma 1 says that is convenient to review a merger when the risk of passing an 
anticompetitive merger, times the transaction size, is larger than the cost of studying the 
operation. This result supports the fact that competition agencies tend to review larger 
transactions that justify the cost of getting crucial information. Small transactions or 
those that are perceived as riskless should not be reviewed.  
 
2.2  Mandatory Mechanism Based on Transaction Size Threshold 
 
In this mechanism, the competition agency reviews all mergers whose transaction size is 
above a pre-established threshold S
*. As mentioned, it is not optimal to submit all 
mergers to a review since some of them are likely to be competitive or have a null impact 
on welfare. Unfortunately, a formal rule cannot be based in the result of equation (1) as 
the parameter ρ is not verifiable. However, it is feasible and partially optimal to define 
the threshold in function of S. In practice, most of the known mandatory mechanisms like 
those of U.S, Europe, Canada and Japan for instance are based on variables related to S 
and not with ρ in order to avoid ambiguities when interpreting the law. We also name this 
mandatory mechanism as “traditional” since is the one applied in most of the developed 
countries. 
The optimality of S
* can be directly obtained from the CA’s objective function. In order 
to avoid corner solutions, we assume that C ≤ Smax , otherwise no merger will be subject 
to review by the CA. The value of S
* can be deduced from the following maximization 
problem: 
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From this last equation we can deduce that mergers should be reviewed if: 
E[ρ] S
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Lemma 2: On a mandatory mechanism based on transaction size threshold, a merger 
must be notified if and only if the size of the merger times the expected competitive risk of 
the population of mergers is greater than the cost of reviewing an operation. 
The solution expressed by (2) differs from the result obtained in equation (1) since the 
traditional mandatory scheme fixes the notification threshold based only in the 
transaction size. When choosing the optimal threshold S
*, the lawmaker takes in account 
the average competitive risk of the population of mergers which is represented by E[ρ]. 
On the contrary, under the discretional mechanism, the CA decides the action to 
undertake using the information provided by two parameters: S and ρ.  
Clearly, two types of errors are incurred when using a traditional mandatory mechanism 
with respect to the discretional scheme defined in (1). First, some mergers that do not 
possess a large competitive risk are reviewed despite their magnitude, that is when ρ < 
E[ρ]. Second, some other mergers that should be reviewed are not when ρ > E[ρ].  
In figure 1 we graph both mechanisms: the discretional and the traditional one. The curve 
qq represents equation (1) and divides in two the space (ρ,S). At the left hand side of the 
  8qq frontier we have the set of merger that it is not efficient to review, whereas at the right 
hand side are the mergers that must be investigated.  The traditional mandatory 
mechanism is illustrated by the vertical dotted line that starts at S*. Then, only the 















The two types of relative errors of the traditional mechanism are observed on Figure 1. 
Region II contains the mergers that are free from notification since their transaction size 
is below the threshold but are risky in their respective market. On the contrary, region III 
include those mergers with low competitive risk but that would be reviewed anyway 
since their size is above the threshold S
*.  
Lemma 3: A discretional mandatory mechanism is superior to one based only in the size 
of the merger. Under the latter some harmless merger are controlled (Region III) while 
others with a high risk of being anticompetitive are free from revision (Region II).  
The superiority of the discretional mechanism hinges on the fact that employs more 
information than the traditional system, which is based only on one parameter: the size of 
the merger.  
 
  9The performance of the traditional mandatory system could be improved, for instance, if 
the CA applies a short inspection to the mergers falling in region III, without allocating 
the same resources as the case when the competitive risk is higher.
7 Undoubtedly, this 
action would be time and resource saving. Also, it helps to define the optimal threshold 
S* (by moving it to the left) in a way that some mergers located in region II will go to 
revision. However, the cost of analyzing mergers in region III will not be totally 
eliminated. First, the CA has the mandate to review them and some resources will be 
spent at least to explain why there is not need of further examination, and second, 
because the firms have the obligation to notify the merger and wait for the 
pronouncement of the CA before finalizing the operation. Notice that there is no 
equivalent action that allows us to reduce the error of region II, since mergers lying in 
region II are excluded by law from antitrust control.  
 
2.3  Voluntary mechanism 
 
We follow a set up similar to the one employed by Choe and Shekhar (2006). Under that 
scheme, merging firms make the first move by deciding whether to report or not the 
merger to the antitrust agency. After that decision, the CA must resolve the course of 
action to undertake about the merger. The sequences of actions of the voluntary 
mechanism are the following:  
T=1  The lawmaker sets the rules about merger notification, defining which merger 
should be notified to the CA. In our model, firms are not obliged to notify when 
their merger is competitive, i.e. when θ=1.  
T=2  Firms learn θ and decide whether to inform the action to the CA. If they decide to 
notify, they have to wait until the CA pronounces a positive decision about the 
merger. If firms do not notify the operation to the agency, the merger continues 
knowing that the CA can react adversely.  
                                                 
7 The compulsory mechanisms of the U.S. and Europe have a preliminary review or first phase stage where 
the CA applies a first screening to the submitted mergers. 
 10T=3  The CA, by observing S and ρ, decides to open a case according to the action 
followed by the firms. If the firms notify, the CA reviews the case under the same 
procedure described for the mandatory schemes. On the contrary, if the firms opt 
for not reporting the merger, the CA decides whether to open an investigation or 
not. Note that when firms do not submit the case for approval, they continue with 
the merger. 
T=4  In case that the CA opens an investigation without notification and it discovers 
that the merger is welfare decreasing, the CA is entitled to contest the merger and 
fine the firms with F>0. On the other hand, if the investigation concludes that the 
action is pro competitive the CA closes the case. It is assumed that the merger is 
irreversible and thus it cannot be reversed once implemented, independently of 
the outcome resulted from the investigation.
8 
The objective behind this mechanism is to provide incentives for self-selection in such a 
way that those mergers without competitive concerns should not be reported. On the 
other hand, mergers which are likely to be anticompetitive should opt for notification. 
Thus, the challenge is to give the interested parties strong incentives for notification when 
it is necessary. Naturally, when a merger is anti competitive, firms need to obtain a higher 
benefit reporting the action than not reporting it. 
The change in the private benefit of merging parties with respect to the status quo is 
captured by a function U(S, θ). It is assumed that U( ) ≥ 0, where U( ) is increasing in the 
transaction size and decreasing with respect to the second argument. That is, mergers are 
more profitable when the transaction size is higher and when they are less competitive.
9  
The antitrust system -competition law and institutions- has two instruments to induce 
firms to notify when is due. The first is the probability to investigate given the fact that 
firms did not report the activity and the second, is the possibility to fine the firms if the 
merger investigation shows an adverse result. We denote the probability of investigating 
a merger by X, which is a discretional decision of the CA. The fine is fixed exogenously 
                                                 
8 The irreversibility of the process is a convenience assumption that simplifies the problem. We later 
release this assumption.  
9 For instance, mergers that rise prices, create entry barriers or make more feasible collusion, are likely to 
be more privately profitable but less socially desirable. 
 11either by a law that specifies the magnitude of fines for this type of behavior or by an 
independent third party like a court of justice. 
The incentive compatible condition that induces firms to report an anticompetitive 
merger is obtained by the following equations: 
 
0
) , ( ) , ( ) 1 ( 1 1
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Where Um denotes the utility when firms merge without notification and Un the utility if 
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This inequality deserves some comments. First, as the probability is bounded in the 
interval [0,1], the change in the utility when firms merge without notification cannot be 
higher than the perceived cost in case they are punished. If fines are capped, some 
mergers will not be notified since they still get a positive benefit even if they are fined 
afterwards. Second, since the utility is increasing in the transaction size, the probability of 
investigating a merger also must be increasing in S.  
The Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this sequential game of voluntary notification and ex –
post inspection is characterized as follows: 
  The CA sets a monitoring policy such that for a not notified merger of size S, it 
opens an investigation with a probability slightly above the minimum value X
*(S), 
which induces all the anticompetitive mergers to be reported.  
  If the merger is anticompetitive, the operation it is notified to the CA and 
consequently reviewed by the agency at cost C. 
  If the merger is competitive the firms do not notify the operation. The CA 
consequently reviews the case according to the probability X
*(S).  
Notice that although in equilibrium only the competitive mergers are not notified, the CA 
must commit to apply its monitoring policy defined by X(s). Otherwise, the mechanism 
 12unravels and the anticompetitive mergers will take advantage of the lack of monitoring of 
the CA, and will not notify their operations. Also, it is worth to mention that the plain act 
of notification does not relieve the CA from performing the revision of the merger in 
order to reject it. Even if the CA knows with total certainty that a notified merger is 
anticompetitive, the agency must generate the information for supporting the blocking of 
the operation before a court of justice.
10 
Like in the discretional mandatory system, it is not optimal to apply the reviewing policy 
defined in (3) to the full set of transactions. For each merger, characterized by the 
observable parameters (S,ρ), the CA compares the benefits of not reviewing and let the 
firms merge versus applying the monitoring policy. Within the timing of the voluntary 
mechanism, the decision whether to apply or not the monitoring policy is done in T =3. 
Notice that the decision to apply the monitoring policy is not the same as the decision to 
monitor a merger. In the latter a merger can be investigated with probability X(s), while 
in the former the merger is totally left out of revision. 
If the CA decides not to investigate at all, both types of mergers will take place, the 
competitive and the anticompetitive ones. The value of the no review option in terms of 
social welfare is equal to: 
) 2 1 ( 0    S W  
The social value of the optimal monitoring policy as a function of  and S is:  
] ) ( )[ 1 (
* C S X S C Wm          
With probability  the merger is anticompetitive and by the incentive compatibility 
condition it is notified and reviewed at cost C and then rejected by the agency. On the 
other hand, with probability (1-) the merger is competitive and it is not reported by 
firms. Then, the CA investigates the case with probability X
*(s) as defined by equation 3. 
Therefore, it would be optimal to apply the monitoring policy if and only if Wm ≥ W0, or 
if: 
] ) ( ) 1 [(
*       S X C S    (4) 
                                                 
10 Otherwise the firms may appeal to a court of justice that the merger is refused without any justification. 
Courts of Justice are not Bayesian, therefore they cannot resolve based on the updating of information due 
to the screening property of the merger control mechanism. They decide on the base of the hard 
information generated by the examination process. 
 13The result provided by equation (4) can be compared with the similar condition obtained 
in (1). In the latter, the policy is deterministic in the sense that all mergers that satisfy this 
condition will be reviewed with total certainty, while in the former the candidates for 
revision will be investigated with some probability between zero and one. The difference 
between condition (1) and (4) is that in the right hand side of the latter equation, the cost 
of reviewing a merger is multiplied by a coefficient that is lower that one.
11 Thus, the 
voluntary mechanism reduces the expected cost of enforcement because it is not socially 
optimal to review all non reported mergers as the incentive compatible condition (3) 
shows.  
We can graph the optimal monitoring policy in the (ρ,S) space. The frontier pp in figure 2 
corresponds to the equation (4) in state of equality. All mergers at the down left hand side 
of the frontier are not notified neither investigated. The mergers lying at the up right side 
of the frontier are notified and controlled if they are anticompetitive, whereas the 
competitive transaction are not notified and the CA investigates them with probability 
X
*(S). In technical terms we have a pooling equilibrium for low values of ρ and S where 
the CA is not interested in controlling mergers. Conversely, for high values of ρ and S 
there is separation of types where the notification of anticompetitive mergers is induced 
by the monitoring policy X
*(S). 
A first comparison on the effective cost of controlling mergers between the discretional 
mandatory and voluntary mechanism can be stated.  
Lemma 4: For a given set of mergers belonging to the space (ρ,S), the cost of 
enforcement is lower under a voluntary mechanism than a discretional mandatory 
scheme. A similar level of effectiveness in terms of error is achieved by both mechanisms, 
but the voluntary mechanism does it with a lower cost. 
This is the result obtained by Choe and Shekhar (2006). Given that the voluntary 
mechanism creates a sort of self-selection of firms, it induces the same number of cases 
than in the mandatory scheme being submitted but at a lower effective cost. In terms of 
objectives pursued by the competition law, the performance of both schemes – the 
                                                 
11 The coefficient that multiplies C in the right hand side of equation 4 corresponds to a weighted average 
between the probability of monitoring X
*(s) and 1. 
 14identification error – would be equal, that is, both mechanisms avoid that the same 
number of anti competitive mergers to take place, but the implementation cost is lower 
under a voluntary mechanism.  
Since the inspection cost is reduced in real terms using a voluntary mechanism, it is 
optimal to investigate more mergers, improving further the effectiveness of this 
mechanism with respect to the mandatory one. This effect is represented in Figure 2 
where the frontier pp of the voluntary mechanism corresponds to an inward shift of the 
inspection frontier qq. One important implication of this result is that under a voluntary 
mechanism, more anticompetitive mergers are blocked compared to a mandatory 
mechanism. Such increment in the set of merger to be potentially reviewed is optimal 
since the benefit from marginally inspecting more mergers outweighs the cost generated 
by it. Although in aggregate terms the mandatory mechanism performs more revisions, 
the voluntary system allocates better the resources in the more dangerous cases, which 
reinforce the deterrence effect of the latter system. 
Corollary 1: The lower enforcement cost of the voluntary system, allows blocking more 







The advantage of a voluntary system relies on the fact that the CA acts after the firms 
have taken a decision about notifying, which provides some information to the CA about 
the competitive risk of the merger. Since the CA moves in a second place, the agency 
does not have to perform controls in the hundred percent of cases that are needed. The 
 15credible treat of an ex –post review, and the risk of being fined, discourages anti 
competitive mergers to take place without notification. On the other hand, competitive 
mergers are not reported despite that eventually –ex post– they are investigated. Although 
in equilibrium only competitive mergers are not notified, the CA cannot evade the 
monitoring. Otherwise the anticompetitive cases will not be reported as well, leading to a 
clear suboptimal policy. It is crucial the commitment of the CA to the optimally defined 
monitoring policy. 
Given the advantages of the voluntary mechanism with respect to the discretional 
mandatory one, as shown in lemma 3, and the advantages of the latter respect to the 
traditional mandatory mechanism, by transitivity we conclude that the voluntary scheme 
is a superior solution than the mandatory system based on transaction size threshold.  
Proposition 1: A voluntary merger notification mechanism is superior to a traditional 
mechanism where notification is compulsory over a size threshold. This superiority is due 
to two effects: (i) The discretionality effect and (ii) The screening effect. 
These two effects follow form lemma 3 and 4 respectively. The voluntary scheme gives 
discretionally to the CA about the set of mergers to be investigated. The CA performs 
revisions following a case-by-case approach after observing two parameters S and ρ and 
does not follow a pre-established ex-ante rule based only in the transaction size S. 
Besides, the voluntary scheme does not require inspecting all the universe of potential 
anti competitive mergers. It induces the firms to self-select themselves and to opt for 
notifying the operation when it is socially desirable to do so. 
3.  Constrained Fines 
 
If fines for unlawful no notification are exogenously capped, some of the mergers will 
not be reported even if firms are punished for that omission. This undesired behavior will 
occur for the mergers that entail a larger transaction size, which in turn are the ones to 
create the largest social cost in case of being anticompetitive.   
To illustrate this phenomenon, we define as S
** the merger size such that U(S
**,θ-1) = Fm, 
where Fm is the maximum penalty. Then, for all mergers such that S > S
** the transaction 
will not be notified despite that the merger is anticompetitive and the firms will be fined 
 16for that omission. Those firms will prefer to consummate the merger, even knowing that 
with probability one the CA will investigate the operation and will punish them for not 
notification.  
In this case of limited fines, the advantage of a voluntary mechanism disappears since it 
is not possible to block large anticompetitive mergers. In this scenario, the comparison of 
mechanisms –voluntary versus mandatory- renders an ambiguous result that will depend 
on the level of maximum fines and the probability of having large mergers among the 
population (S > S
**).  
A superior solution consists in a mixed mechanism where notification is voluntary for 
mergers with S  S
** and compulsory for the set of mergers where S > S
**.  In figure 3 we 
represent this optimal mechanism, subject to the constraint on the maximum fine. At the 
size S
** the discretional obligatory mechanism becomes equivalent to the voluntary 
system, because by definition, a merger of size S
** is monitored with probability equal to 
one. Hence, equations (3) and (4) that represent the optimal policies on both mechanism 
are equivalent al at S = S
** since X
*(S
**) = 1. Graphically S
** is the value at which 











ρ   
 
 












Proposition 2: If maximum fines are not large enough to induce the whole population of 
mergers to pre- notify, the optimal policy is the following: 
 17(i) If S
* < S
**, all mergers above S
** must pre-notify the operation no matter if they are 
pro or anti-competitive. For mergers below S




** the optimal policy is to make mandatory the notification for S > S
* and 
voluntary for S < S
*. 
 
If we are in case (i), for values of S > S
** the obligation to notify dominates voluntary 
notification since in the latter, no merger will be notified and by consequence the error 
associated to the materialization of anticompetitive mergers will be maximum. In 
contrast, under forced notification, that error is zero. However, there are some 
competitive mergers that the CA is obliged to inform despite their low competitive risk 
(those located below frontier qq and to the left of S
**). This error of over-notification is 




* is defined as the merger size threshold that minimize the aggregate error of the 
mandatory notification system. At the size S
*, in the margin both errors are equal, 
therefore for values of S greater than S
*, the error no notification must be larger than the 
error of over notification. 
 
In case (ii) -when S
* > S
** - it is not optimal to make mandatory the notification above 
S
** because the error of over notification is greater than the error of omission. Thus, the 
threshold for compulsory notification is set at S
*. As in the mandatory mechanism, 
mergers with S > S
* are obliged to notify and by consequence anticompetitive mergers in 
that range are prevented. If S
**< S < S
*, no merger is notified which means that all 
operations are materialized without revision. Only if S < S
** we have separation of types 
and the voluntary mechanism induces the proper separations of types. In the limit case of 
zero fine, the voluntary system converge to a traditional mandatory system, where all 
mergers above S
* must compulsorily notify. 
 
Corollary 2: A traditional mandatory notification system based on transaction threshold 
is a particular case of an optimal voluntary system with no fines for unlawful omission to 
notify. 
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4.  Remedies 
 
In merger control, the decision of the CA is not always constrained to a binary policy of 
either approving or rejecting the concentration. In most of the complex cases, mergers are 
allowed subject to conditions that are called remedies. 
These remedies render acceptable mergers that are anticompetitive if permitted in its 
original proposal, but at the same time reduce the private benefit that firms obtain from 
the operation. For the sake of simplicity we assume that all anticompetitive mergers can 
be modified in a way that they become competitively harmless through remedies. We 
define Z as a variable that represents the intensity of the remedy or the level of 
intervention applied to the merger, such that Z belongs to the interval [0,1]. If Z = 0, the 
merger is accepted in its original proposal while Z =1 represents the most satisfactory 
remedy for the CA but leaves no private benefit to the merging firms (see figure 4). 
With the possibility of remedies the private benefit of the merger as a function of Z 
becomes: 
U(S,Z) = (1-Z)U(S) 
The change in welfare function becomes 





Z S W   ,  
The parameter Z
*is the minimum level of remedy that avoids an anticompetitive merger. 
We further assume that Z
* > 0.5, which implies that a merger fixed through remedies 
cannot renders a higher welfare than an originally competitive merger, for any size S of 
the operation. 
The way the performance of both types of mechanisms –mandatory and voluntary- are 
affected by the introduction of remedies is analyzed under two scenarios: (i) Full 
Commitment and (ii) Activism. 
 
 19Figure 4 
   
U(Z) 







Z   
 
 
(i) Full Commitment 
Under full commitment, the CA does not go beyond what is necessary to accept the 
merger. It means that the level of remedy chosen is Z = Z
* which by definition makes 
W(S,Z) = 0. Under the voluntary mechanism, the incentive compatibility condition that 
induces anticompetitive mergers to notify becomes: 
(1-Z
*)U(s)  X (U(s) –F) + (1-X) U(s) 









s X d d    (5) 
Compared with the condition of equation (3), the remedy Z
* reduces the minimum 




d(S). Since firms have now a strictly positive benefit for notifying, they 
are now more willing to report the operation with respect to the situation where the 
notification led to rejection. The lower the level of intervention (lower Z
*) needed to fix 
the competitive problems of the merger, the higher the incentives of the firms to notify 
the merger and the lower is the monitoring required to induce the report to CA. In this 
sense, the remedies that both parties may accord act as a “carrot” to the firms whereas the 
fine plays the role of a “stick”. As we see in equation 5, both instruments are useful to 
induce notification when is needed. 
 20The implementation of remedies at level Z
* does not affect the objective function of the 
CA respect to the case of no remedies at all. In both cases the change in welfare is equal 
to zero, either the merger is totally rejected or it is accepted under intervention Z
*. Hence, 
the expected value of monitoring policy in terms of S and  becomes: 
C C S X S S W d m       ] ) ( )[ 1 (
*  
Therefore, with remedies, the condition for being optimal to review a merger is: 
)] ( ) 1 ( [
* S X C S d        (6) 
 
Making the comparison with equation 4, the term in the right hand side of equation 6 is 




d(S). This lower “effective” cost of monitoring will induce the CA to open more cases 
to revision, shifting inwards the frontier pp of Figure 2. 
The effectiveness of both compulsory mechanisms is not affected by the existence of 
remedies of magnitude Z
*. As we explained, the value of the objective function of the CA 
remains unmodified either the merger is rejected or allowed with the minimum 
intervention.  
Proposition 3: If mergers that are originally anticompetitive can be modified through 
minimum intervention remedies Z
*, the voluntary mechanism performs even better than 
the mandatory mechanisms. This additional advantage is explained by the higher 
incentives firms have to self notify when mergers can be amended instead of rejected, 
which in turn reduces the minimum monitoring effort to induce notification. 
 
(i)  Activism 
 
We say that the CA follows an activist policy if it tries to extract the maximum surplus 
from the merging firms. This policy makes sense because it increases the value of the 
objective function defined for the agency. 
 21Under the discretional mandatory mechanism the value of controlling a merger in 
function of the intensity Z of the remedy is now: 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( *      
Z
Z
S S C Z Wr    
The value of not controlling is always W0 = S(1-2). Thus, the condition that makes 





   (7) 
Compared with equation 2, which represents the case of no remedies, the effective cost is 
reduced by a coefficient that is decreasing in the level of intervention Z. As we observe, 
in the case of full commitment, where Z = Z
*, there is no extra benefit for controlling 
mergers respect to the no remedies situation. Since the benefit of controlling a merger is 
increasing with Z, it is expected that the agency be more willing to inspect a merger when 
it can extract a higher benefit form it in terms of welfare. 
In the traditional mandatory mechanism, the optimal threshold S
*in function of the 
intensity of the remedy Z is obtained through the following maximization program: 
   

 
      
1
00 * ) ( ) ( ] ) 1 ( ) 1 ( [ ) ( ) 2 1 (
*
max
* *      d g ds s f C
Z
Z













  (8) 
The threshold S
* is lower with respect to the no remedy scenario for Z  Z
* and 
decreasing in Z. Like in the discretional mechanism, a higher level of intervention Z 
gives more incentives to the CA to inspect mergers, reducing further the minimum size 
that makes convenient to control a merger. 
Lemma 5: An activist policy that imposes remedies such that Z  Z
* induces the CA to 
control more mergers because it increases the value the agency obtains from reviewing 
 22the transactions. If there is no extra cost for the agency to implement the remedies, the 
optimum in the mandatory mechanisms is to apply the maximum level of remedies Z =1. 
 
In the voluntary mechanism, both, the value of controlling a merger and the incentive 
compatibility condition are affected by applying a remedy larger than Z
*. The minimum 
probability of monitoring X in function of Z, that induces self-notification, is obtained 
from:  
(1-Z)U(s)  X (U(s) –F) + (1-X) U(s) 







s X d d    
As we observe, a higher intensity of remedy increases the minimum probability of 
monitoring. Since the prize for self-notification is decreasing in Z, the CA has to increase 
the probability of controlling in order to offset the first effect. 
The condition for applying the optimal monitoring policy instead of leaving the firms to 
merge is: 
) 2 1 ( ) )( 1 ( )] 1 ( [
*
*            S C X S
Z
Z
S C d  
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C S          (9) 
If the CA applies stronger remedies to a merger, it extracts a higher social welfare from 
the operation, but at the same time it demands more monitoring in order to induce self-
notification. The first effect, that is positive, is reflected in the denominator that 
accompanies the cost C at the right hand side of equation 9. The second effect works 
through the monitoring probability Xd
*, term that is increasing in Z. 
In terms of comparison between both mechanisms we can state the following lemma: 
 23Lemma 6: For any value of intensity of remedies Z, such that Z > Z
*, the voluntary 
mechanism dominates any mandatory mechanism.  
Like in the comparison between both mechanisms without remedies, the CA can avoid 
the same set of anticompetitive mergers to be consummated but a lower enforcement cost 
using the voluntary system. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
Our paper shows the benefits of the voluntary merger notification mechanism compared 
with the currently employed mandatory system, where the operation must be notified if 
they are above a size threshold.  Besides the second move monitoring advantage of the 
voluntary mechanism, there is a benefit arising form the flexibility that the competition 
agency has in the choice of mergers to control. Instead of following an ex-ante rule based 
uniquely on merger size, the agency may employ more information –like anticompetitive 
risk- at the moment of deciding to investigate or not an operation.  
 
The superiority of the voluntary mechanism strongly relies on the ability of the antitrust 
system to promptly respond to anticompetitive mergers that omit notification. If the 
instruments, like fines, are not enough to induce notification, then the advantages of the 
voluntary regime disappears and some large anticompetitive mergers will be 
consummated. Under this scenario, the best solution is to apply a mixed mechanism 
where notification is compulsory above a certain threshold, and voluntary below that. 
 
Finally, the possibility that the competition agency and the firms may agree on remedies 
to fix anticompetitive mergers acts as an additional instrument to induce firms to notify 
their operation. The effect of the remedies is a reduction in the implementation cost of the 
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